Understanding the World: The Challenge of Consciousness
Examining Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”
Author’s Preface
I read this paper, Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, decades ago, but the wisdom displayed by the author has stuck with me all of that time. I decided it was time to revisit the paper. Perhaps others will read it and find that it resonates with them as well. I had ChatGPT prepare this summary of his short piece, which can be found at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914.
Introduction
The relationship between mind and body has long perplexed philosophers, particularly in the context of consciousness. Thomas Nagel's seminal essay What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974) challenges reductionist approaches that attempt to explain consciousness solely through physical or functional terms. Nagel argues that consciousness, particularly the subjective nature of experience, cannot be fully captured by objective scientific methods. His essay has become a cornerstone in discussions about the "hard problem" of consciousness, raising questions that remain unresolved. Nagel uses the metaphor of a bat’s echolocation to illustrate how radically different subjective experiences can be and why they resist reductive explanations. Understanding the implications of Nagel’s work helps to explore the complexities of consciousness, subjectivity, and the limits of scientific knowledge.
Detailed Explanation of Nagel’s Essay
The Central Argument
Nagel opens by identifying consciousness as the most significant aspect of the mind-body problem and criticizes reductionist approaches for their failure to account for subjective experience. He notes that while scientific reduction has successfully explained other phenomena (e.g., water as H₂O, heat as molecular motion), consciousness remains elusive. The key issue, according to Nagel, is the subjective character of experience. Consciousness involves having a specific point of view—there is something it feels like to be a conscious organism, and this subjective experience cannot be fully understood from an objective, third-person perspective (Nagel, 1974).
The Bat Example
To highlight the challenge, Nagel introduces the bat as an example. Bats use sonar (echolocation) to navigate, a sensory system that humans do not possess. Although we can describe the physical processes of echolocation, we cannot imagine what it is like for the bat to perceive the world in this way. Nagel argues that our inability to grasp the bat’s subjective experience underscores the limits of human imagination when trying to understand consciousness from the inside out. This leads to the conclusion that the subjective aspect of experience cannot be reduced to physical processes alone.
Nagel distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: objective knowledge, which can be observed from multiple perspectives, and subjective knowledge, which is tied to a particular point of view. Bats have subjective experiences just as humans do, but those experiences are inaccessible to us because we cannot take up the bat’s point of view. This notion challenges the reductionist view that consciousness can be fully explained by physicalism or functionalism. Even if we were to fully map the brain processes involved in echolocation, we would still not understand what it is like for a bat to experience the world this way (Nagel, 1974).
Critique of Reductionism
Nagel’s critique extends to various philosophical theories that attempt to reduce mental states to physical or functional states. For example, the identity theory, which equates mental states with brain states, overlooks the subjective nature of experience. Functionalism, which defines mental states in terms of their causal roles in producing behavior, is also inadequate because it ignores the "what it is like" aspect of consciousness. A robot or automaton could theoretically fulfill all the functional roles of a human being without having any subjective experience (Nagel, 1974).
According to Nagel, the problem with reductionist theories is that they aim to explain everything in terms of objective, third-person descriptions, while consciousness is inherently first-person and subjective. Without addressing this subjective character, reductionist approaches will always leave something out.
Objective Phenomenology: A Speculative Solution
Toward the end of the essay, Nagel suggests that a new kind of theory might be needed to bridge the gap between subjective experience and objective scientific explanation. He speculates about the development of an "objective phenomenology" that could describe subjective experiences in terms that are comprehensible even to beings who do not share those experiences. This approach might allow us to describe what it is like for a bat to use sonar, or for a blind person to experience sound. However, Nagel admits that such a theory is far in the future and that current scientific paradigms are ill-equipped to handle the subjective aspects of consciousness (Nagel, 1974).
Conclusion
Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat? remains a powerful critique of reductionist approaches to the mind-body problem. By emphasizing the subjective character of consciousness, Nagel highlights the limitations of physicalist and functionalist theories that ignore or inadequately address this aspect of mental life. His bat example serves as a vivid metaphor for the inaccessibility of subjective experience from an external perspective, reinforcing the idea that consciousness cannot be fully explained through objective, third-person descriptions. While Nagel does not offer a definitive solution, he opens the door to future exploration, suggesting that new conceptual frameworks, such as an "objective phenomenology," may eventually help bridge the gap between subjective and objective understanding. Until then, the problem of consciousness remains an open question, central to both philosophy and cognitive science.
There was a time in my life when I read such things avidly. I still retain an interest.
References
This essay provides a detailed breakdown of Nagel’s work and places it within the broader philosophical context by citing the thinkers he critiques.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435-450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
Author Note: Thomas Nagel is a prominent American philosopher, best known for his work in ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of mind. He is currently a professor at New York University and is widely regarded for his critiques of reductionism and physicalism.
Theme Note: This essay argues that consciousness, particularly the subjective experience of being a conscious organism, cannot be fully captured by reductionist theories. The bat example illustrates how subjective experience is inaccessible from an objective standpoint.
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophy and scientific realism. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
Author Note: J.J.C. Smart was an influential philosopher known for his contributions to the identity theory of mind, which posits that mental states are identical to physical brain states.
Theme Note: Smart’s work supports the reductionist view that mental states can be explained by physical processes. Nagel references this theory to highlight its failure to account for subjective experience.
Dennett, D. C. (1969). Content and consciousness. London: Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Content-and-Consciousness/Dennett/p/book/9780415567862?srsltid=AfmBOooBPuLdKGsXUbjuSXmpBNekqVWdSmLKbGI-IdLPshhZLgYL1jM5
Author Note: Daniel Dennett is a leading philosopher and cognitive scientist, known for his work on consciousness, free will, and the philosophy of mind.
Theme Note: Dennett’s book develops a functionalist theory of mind, which Nagel critiques for ignoring the subjective, first-person character of consciousness.
Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), Semantics of natural language (pp. 334-342). Dordrecht: D. Reidel. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9
Author Note: Saul Kripke is a highly regarded philosopher, known for his work on reference, identity, and modality.
Theme Note: Kripke’s argument that the relationship between mental states and brain states is necessary, not contingent, is related to Nagel’s critique of identity theory.
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. London: Routledge. https://philpapers.org/rec/ARMAMT-5
Author Note: David Armstrong was a prominent Australian philosopher and one of the main proponents of the identity theory in the philosophy of mind.
Theme Note: Armstrong’s materialist theory argues that mental states are brain states, a view that Nagel challenges for its failure to address the subjective aspect of consciousness.
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion (pp. 37-48). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. https://www.phil.uu.nl/~joel/3027/3027PutnamPsychPredicates.pdf
Author Note: Hilary Putnam was a leading philosopher known for his work in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science.
Theme Note: Putnam’s functionalist theory of mind is a target of Nagel’s critique, as it fails to account for the subjective character of mental states.