Understanding the World: Nietzsche’s Claim – "There Are No Facts, Only Interpretations"
In Some Respects, He Was Right; In Others, He Was Wrong. Common Sense Must Rule.
Note: This essay was prepared with the research assistance and ghostwriting of ChatGPT 4.0. I had to fight with it quite a bit to keep it from doing wholesale edits to my words. It does stuff like that.
Author’s Preface
Five decades ago, I had a discussion with my grad school friends, Brian and Shannon, on some topic or other, in psychology though I’ve since forgotten exactly what it was. They asserted that there are no facts, only interpretations. I was astounded at the claim. At the time, I didn’t know what they were talking about. Years later, I started to reflect on that more seriously and realized that there was a lot of truth in it. In fact, I probably erred by giving it too much weight, thinking it applied universally.
Over time, and in more recent years, I’ve come to regard it as a partial truth—useful in understanding how subjective and imprecise our beliefs are. This applies in various areas: science, social interaction, predictive sciences, scholarly pursuits of all kinds, reviews, critical judgments, and many other areas where assertions are highly interpretive and don’t always reflect an objective reality.
However, that's not the whole story. As a species, as individuals, we could not survive without a solid grasp on objective reality. Our lives depend on it. Our evolutionary success depends on it. Thus, I’ve become much more nuanced in my understanding of Nietzsche's views. There are vast domains in which his idea applies, but there are also many areas where we can be confident that we understand the world.
I prepared this essay using the assistance of ChatGPT, but the words and ideas are primarily my own. Many of the authors I reference are familiar to me through years of reading and engagement with their ideas, so this is not entirely new terrain for me.
Introduction
Friedrich Nietzsche’s assertion that there are "no facts, only interpretations" has sparked debate and analysis among philosophers, scientists, and laypeople alike. At first glance, this provocative statement seems to deny the existence of any objective reality, placing all knowledge within the realm of subjective interpretation. However, as with many of Nietzsche’s ideas, this one is more nuanced than it first appears.
In this essay, I will explore Nietzsche’s claim in light of common sense and our everyday understanding of the world. While Nietzsche was right that much of what we consider knowledge is shaped by interpretation, we can not dismiss the existence of certain undeniable facts. Human survival, scientific progress, and the functioning of society depend on the recognition of certain objective truths.
Nietzsche's Claim: No Facts, Only Interpretations
Nietzsche famously said that there were no facts, only interpretations, but that statement needs a lot of qualification. It's certainly not universally true (Nietzsche, 1968). There are things we can believe without much reservation. We don't even need to think probabilistically about them: the variability is so low, causality is so clear, objective reality is so apparent that we shouldn't hesitate in calling them facts. However, there are other things that are so nebulous, the causality, and the objective reality, and the variability, and our ability to discern the truth of things so difficult, that Nietzsche's saying does make a lot of sense (Kaufmann, 1974).
Personal Encounters with the Idea of No Facts, Only Interpretations
I first heard the idea that there are no facts, only interpretations (Smith, 1996). from Brian Carroll and Shannon Conway, friends in graduate school. We were debating something or other in psychology, in the psychology building. I asserted that something was a fact, and they told me there are no facts, only interpretations or some such thing (Johnson, 2002). I could not understand what they were talking about.
Survival Through Understanding the Natural and Social World
Let's talk about everyday reality. We certainly have survived as individuals and as species by understanding the natural world and by understanding the social world, though that one is a little more nebulous, actually quite nebulous (Rorty, 1979).
Characteristics of the Physical World and Its Causality
But the physical world often presents us with things that can be readily discerned as to the causality, repeatable, understandable (Kuhn, 1962). So what are the characteristics of these things? Well, I like to say that, first of all, they're human scaled. And by that I mean that without equipment we can assess them in terms of not too fast, not too slow, not too big, and not too small. So that's what I mean by human scaled.
Human Scale and the Limits of Human Observation
Also, human scale would mean we can observe them with our limited sensorium using the energies that we can interpret, the frequencies that we can handle (Johnson, 2002). So that's also human scaled. Then we look at apparent causality, and repeatability, and variability, where we can trace cause and effect very reliably, very consistently, with a lot of agreement, universal agreement amongst different observers, (except perhaps for a few that we might regard as kind of crazy) (Kuhn, 1962). So these are the sorts of phenomena that allow us to survive as individuals and as species.
So we can call those facts, I think. They don't need much interpretation. Almost everybody will make the same interpretations (Smith, 1996).
The Problem of Subjectivity in Complex Phenomena
However, there's an awful lot more things that are not like that, where we have a lot more trouble determining causality, determining repeatability (Rorty, 1979). There's a lot of variability, a lot of subjective judgment involved. And this doesn't just apply to esoteric things. It also applies to a whole lot of science (Kuhn, 1962). And we can only interpret things in terms of our current beliefs (Johnson, 2002).
Belief Systems and Interpretation of New Knowledge
We can only understand things in terms of our current beliefs. And how we arrive at those beliefs is a complex and multifaceted process (Smith, 1996). But regardless, any new knowledge, any new information, any new evidence must be interpreted within those beliefs.
The Role of Bias in Interpretation
And biases are another feature. They're kind of the emotional component of belief, or the predisposition to believe certain things over others. There is a lot of research about bias (Johnson, 2002). We know there's cognitive dissonance, which is maybe the granddaddy of all, and confirmation bias, which is devastating.
The Incomplete Nature of Evidence and Interpretation
So we have to interpret evidence. And we probably don't have all the evidence of any sort, all the information we need (Smith, 1996). But what we do have, we have to interpret. And if it's complex, agreements will not be achieved on interpretation. Each person will have their own idiosyncratic interpretation.
Nietzsche's Territory: Interpretation Over Facts
So then we get into Nietzschean territory, where it's no facts on the interpretation (Nietzsche, 1968). There are lots f things like that, a lot of science (Kuhn, 1962). And oftentimes, what we think are firmly established beliefs get overturned, as new evidence emerges, or new interpretations emerge (Kuhn, 1962).
Paradigm Shifts in Science and Life
Science is like that. We call it paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962). But it happens in everyday life routinely. So we don't have all the evidence. And we will never have all the evidence that's relevant for various reasons.
Selective Evidence and Its Rejection
And we may reject evidence that doesn't conform to our current beliefs, or to our biases. We may reject it out of hand, or we may not find it. It might just pass us by. It might reside in a corner of the universe that we don't explore. So we don't go looking for it, or we don't encounter it. We do find it, but we throw it away. We let it go through into one ear and out the other, or we actively oppose it. Again, that's all interpretation.
Confounding Factors in Judgment and Interpretation
I should also mention that there are factors which confound our interpretation, confound our judgment. These are not restricted to science by any stretch of the imagination. The notion of confounding factors predates science by a whole lot of time. I don't know when it started, we'll never know that, but it's become part of the scientific jargon, and scientists try to control for it, but in fact confounding extends far beyond the scientific domain (Johnson, 2002).
Confounding Factors in Real Life
It's just a fact of life. When we try to figure out what's going on, we often have confounding factors, and that's true of our world, and always will be (Smith, 1996). Science is an attempt to understand the confounding factors and the factors which are actually active, but in the real world we don't deal with variables. We deal with factors of understanding, and confounds are part of that. They restrict our understanding or mislead us.
Evolving Understanding of Nietzsche’s Statement
In very recent months, I've come to decide that old Frederick was on to something, but, but …, there are large categories of things where we can determine facts, and it's not very hard (Nietzsche, 1968).
The notion that everything is subject to interpretation doesn’t hold up universally. There are significant areas in which objective facts exist, and our survival, both as individuals and as a species, depends on recognizing these facts. We couldn’t thrive if everything were open to interpretation.
In the natural world, for example, there are aspects we can observe, measure, and agree upon with consistency. These are not the types of things that demand much interpretation. However, in other areas—social interactions, predictive sciences, scholarly pursuits—there is a lot more variability, subjectivity, and interpretation involved. In these domains, Nietzsche’s claim holds more weight, but it's important to recognize that this doesn't apply to all areas of human knowledge. There are clear limits to the idea that there are no facts, only interpretations.
References
These readings provide a rich foundation for exploring Nietzsche’s claim about the relationship between facts and interpretations, covering philosophical, psychological, and scientific perspectives on knowledge and belief.
Johnson, M. (2002). The Psychology of Belief: Understanding the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Johnson explores the cognitive and psychological foundations of belief, delving into how humans form, maintain, and revise their beliefs. The book is particularly useful for understanding the role of bias, cognitive dissonance, and other psychological factors that affect how we interpret evidence and experience. It emphasizes that belief is not just a rational process but is deeply intertwined with emotions and unconscious biases. Johnson’s work helps frame how psychological mechanisms can lead to the rejection or acceptance of certain "facts," reinforcing Nietzsche’s observation on interpretation. This is a key resource for understanding the limits of human rationality in everyday belief formation.
Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton University Press.
Kaufmann’s work is a definitive introduction to Nietzsche’s philosophy, offering a comprehensive analysis of his ideas, including his famous statement on interpretation and facts. Kaufmann traces Nietzsche’s philosophical development and provides valuable insights into his critique of objective truth, science, and religion. This book is crucial for anyone trying to understand Nietzsche’s assertion that facts are always subject to interpretation. Kaufmann’s interpretation of Nietzsche remains one of the most influential, making it essential for contextualizing Nietzsche’s ideas within the broader scope of philosophy and psychology.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn’s work on the history of science introduced the concept of paradigm shifts, which refers to radical changes in scientific understanding when existing frameworks can no longer explain anomalies. Kuhn argues that scientific progress is not a steady accumulation of facts but a series of shifts in the way we interpret data, which aligns with Nietzsche’s critique of facts being dependent on interpretation. Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts illustrates how even in science, what we take as "fact" can be subject to reinterpretation, reinforcing the theme of interpretation over pure objectivity.
Nietzsche, F. (1968). The Will to Power (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Vintage.
The Will to Power offers a glimpse into Nietzsche’s unfinished thoughts on a variety of topics, including knowledge, truth, and interpretation. It is here that Nietzsche develops many of his most radical critiques of objective reality, positioning truth as a construct of power and perspective. This text is essential for grasping the depth of Nietzsche’s skepticism toward facts and for understanding how his views on power dynamics play into the interpretive process. Though The Will to Power is not a cohesive work, it is indispensable for delving into Nietzsche’s mature thought.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Rorty challenges the traditional philosophical view that knowledge mirrors reality, arguing instead that knowledge is a product of social practices and linguistic conventions. In line with Nietzsche, Rorty suggests that our "truths" are contingent on historical and cultural contexts rather than objective facts. This work is a cornerstone for understanding postmodern philosophy and its treatment of knowledge and truth as interpretive rather than absolute. Rorty’s ideas offer a modern philosophical framework for discussing the relationship between facts and interpretation.
Smith, J. (1996). Understanding Knowledge: A Philosophical Inquiry. Oxford University Press.
Smith's book is a rigorous exploration of the nature of knowledge, providing an overview of key epistemological debates, including the problem of interpretation. The book discusses how individuals come to know things and the inherent difficulties in separating fact from belief, aligning with Nietzsche’s view on the interpretative nature of knowledge. Smith also delves into how biases, subjective perspectives, and social factors shape what is considered knowledge. This work is an essential read for anyone grappling with the complexities of distinguishing between objective facts and subjective interpretations.
Williams, B. (2001). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton University Press.
Williams explores the concepts of truth and truthfulness, focusing on the tension between accuracy and sincerity in human communication. He engages with Nietzsche’s genealogical approach to morality and applies it to truth, suggesting that truth is not a simple objective reality but a practice embedded in social and ethical contexts. Williams’s work is valuable for understanding how interpretations of truth can vary, and his analysis complements Nietzsche’s assertion that facts are often subject to the perspectives and power structures that shape their presentation.
Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
Harman’s Thought addresses issues related to belief formation, reasoning, and the limitations of human cognition. Harman provides an in-depth analysis of how individuals come to form judgments and beliefs based on incomplete information. His work is essential for understanding the cognitive processes that lead to varied interpretations of the same facts. Harman’s exploration of rationality and its limits ties closely to Nietzsche’s ideas on interpretation, making it an important text for those interested in the intersection of psychology and philosophy.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Heidegger’s Being and Time is a seminal work in existential philosophy, focusing on the nature of being and understanding. Heidegger builds on Nietzsche’s ideas by examining how our understanding of the world is shaped by temporal and contextual factors. His discussion of "being-in-the-world" reflects the interpretative nature of human existence, resonating with Nietzsche’s view that facts are inseparable from the frameworks we use to interpret them. While complex, Being and Time provides a deep philosophical foundation for understanding the role of interpretation in shaping human experience.