Understanding Opinions: Worldviews and Entrails

We all have to believe something or other, but we seem to believe everything we think. Curious that.

Note: This essay was prepared with the research assistance and ghostwriting capabilities of ChatGPT 4.0 (sometimes good, sometimes quite horrible).

Author’s Preface:

I have read a lot of material over the last few days in the aftermath of the election in the United States. Now, I don't have a vested interest in that, being a Canadian—not in the same way that a U.S. citizen would—but I certainly have a vested interest in seeing world peace, harmony, and civil liberties restored, as well as freedom of speech in my own country. And I can't isolate my country from the rest of the world.

So, while I don't have "Trump Derangement Syndrome," I am not entirely convinced he’ll fulfill his promises. He has made a number of points I strongly agree with, and he has appointed some people with whom I mostly align. However, after reading follow-up articles from people in my alternative media community—some on the left, some U.S. Republicans—I see a huge range of opinion about Trump: his motivations, his future actions, and what he truly represents.

Some think it will be the same old story because they believe he is captured by the military-industrial complex and is at heart a warmonger, while others view him as a kind of savior, perhaps even a "second coming." I don’t know where the truth lies, and once again, this brings me back to a point I often make: so much of what we consider "fact" is really just opinion. In this essay, I use the metaphor of "reading the entrails" to explore this idea.

Introduction

In exploring the nature of belief, truth, and social understanding, we confront the complex interplay between objective facts, subjective interpretations, and culturally constructed conventions. While certain facts serve as essential foundations for survival and practical decision-making, much of what we consider knowledge falls within the domain of interpretation, colored by individual perspectives and worldviews. This distinction grows particularly sharp when we examine social conventions—shared understandings that vary widely across cultures and lack the fixedness of factual truths. Yet, individuals often cling to their interpretations as if they were universal truths, fostering disagreements and biases that are deeply embedded in human cognition. The following discussion examines these dynamics, questioning the lines between fact and interpretation and probing the limitations of objectivity in the realms of belief, social norms, and knowledge.

Discussion

Worldviews and Entrails

The metaphor of “reading the entrails” aptly describes how diverse groups—political pundits, armchair philosophers, everyday individuals, as well as academics and researchers—approach complex issues (cf. Nietzsche, 1887). Nietzsche's well-known claim that "there are no facts, only interpretations" seems mostly accurate, though it may oversimplify certain realities (Nietzsche, 1887/1974). While many facets of knowledge are interpretive, some information, particularly regarding practical matters like construction, safety, and technology, are factual and self-evident. Such facts transcend interpretation because they are based on verifiable and reproducible outcomes. However, when it comes to topics like political commentary, climate science, public opinion polling, medical science, and health research, these analyses become more speculative. Here, interpretation takes precedence, and we find ourselves once again reading the entrails to understand meaning (cf. Kahneman, 2011; Collins, 2002).

Divination and Human Limitations

Another way to describe this process of interpretation could be “reading tea leaves” or engaging in some form of divination, though humanity lacks notable skill in this area. Perhaps this limitation stems from insufficient intelligence or from the way we are conditioned by a mix of valid information, misinformation, and disinformation, without any consistently reliable method for distinguishing among them (cf. Aikin & Talisse, 2020). In some instances, we may succeed in teasing apart truth from falsehood, but this is not guaranteed. Personally, I approach this interpretive challenge from the perspective of a Pyrrhonian skeptic, a position that, rather than being merely pragmatic, reflects a core aspect of Pyrrhonian skepticism (Annas & Barnes, 1985). I suspect that Pyrrhonian skeptics of the past were practical in their everyday affairs while still holding a theoretical commitment to suspension of judgment. Like myself, they likely accepted many things without active questioning in their daily interactions.

Worldviews and Skepticism

Every individual holds a worldview, including skeptics who, like anyone else, determine some things to be true and others false, acting based on these judgments. This perspective may be adjusted over time due to new information, shifts in memory, or other factors (cf. Rorty, 1989). This process seems aligned with classical skeptical thought, which suggests that beliefs are provisional and subject to change based on new evidence or reflection. However, my knowledge of skepticism is limited to occasional readings and does not encompass formal scholarship in the area.

Competing Claims and Contradictions

A fundamental issue arises with competing claims that are so mutually exclusive they cannot be reconciled by any amount of nuance or qualification. In these cases, the claims stand in direct opposition, where basic logic dictates that both cannot be correct simultaneously (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV). When applied to numerous contradictory claims, the situation only intensifies: at most, only one claim can be accurate among those that are entirely incompatible with each other. This illustrates the principle of non-contradiction, which states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same context.

Correctness and Coincidence

In cases of competing claims, one claim might indeed be correct, but its correctness may be coincidental rather than reasoned. Typically, claims are not standalone; they are embedded within complex arguments, often challenging to analyze and requiring considerable effort to disentangle (cf. Toulmin, 1958). Even sophisticated tools, like ChatGPT, can struggle with this task, sometimes providing accurate summaries but frequently missing key points or introducing errors. Thus, among contradictory claims, one might be coincidentally correct or supported by argument. However, from a skeptical perspective, distinguishing between coincidental correctness and reasoned correctness is a tenuous endeavor at best, given the inherent uncertainties in interpretive processes (cf. Popper, 1959).

Proof and Psychological Conviction

Proof, in practice, operates more as an expression of belief than as a purely logical construct. While logic provides a structure for proofs, the validity of proof ultimately relies on psychological conviction. Without this conviction, one does not accept something as proven, despite any formal logical demonstration (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953). This is particularly relevant in communicative contexts, where proof must persuade others of its validity. Even in mathematics, where proofs are rigorously logical, acceptance of proof still depends on the mathematician's personal assurance of correctness, highlighting that proof is, fundamentally, a psychological process (cf. Lakatos, 1976).

Competing Claims and Interpretation

Returning to the issue of competing claims, only one claim, at most, can be correct for any given assertion, though it is often the case that a blend of true and false assertions coexist within complex arguments. This leaves us to interpret the claims much as one would “read the entrails” in divination—whether one is an accurate interpreter or simply coincidentally correct is not easily determined (cf. Collins, 2002). When observing pundits or commentators, it becomes clear that their assertions cannot all be simultaneously true, despite each claiming logic, evidence, and truth on their side. Yet, the evidence they present is inevitably subject to interpretation, with only the simplest cases yielding clarity without extensive interpretive effort (cf. Hanson, 1958). Ultimately, all analysis is a form of "reading the entrails," as interpretation remains embedded in every level of these evaluations.

Worldview and Its Inescapability

The concept of worldview is both universal and inescapable. Every person, regardless of background or perspective, possesses a worldview shaped by beliefs, biases, comprehension, and both linguistic and pre-linguistic understandings. This worldview encompasses our sensory experiences, encompassing both internal and external perceptions, as well as the various senses through which we interpret reality (cf. Dilthey, 1910). Additionally, worldview is influenced by an array of factors, some of which may appear arbitrary or random. Over time, our worldview adapts and shifts, though we inevitably adopt beliefs and values we deem accurate or reliable. This holds true for everyone—whether skeptic, cynic, optimist, or someone without a particular philosophical alignment. While committed skeptics may strive to hold their beliefs more tentatively, they, too, are bound by a worldview and are subject to the same limitations as others. In essence, holding a worldview is a necessity; it is not something one can opt out of (cf. Gadamer, 1960).

Divergence and Changing Perspectives

Throughout life, one often experiences shifts in alignment with others' views, routinely finding agreement with some people and disagreement with others. At times, a pundit, author, or speaker may initially seem insightful, yet over time, as one delves deeper into their ideas, areas of divergence begin to emerge. These differences may gradually reveal substantial or even fundamental shifts in values, leading to stark contrasts between one’s beliefs and those of the other person (cf. Rokeach, 1973). This process is common and can lead to significant changes in relationships: friendships may falter when fundamental disagreements arise, or admiration for public figures may wane once their core beliefs are understood and found incompatible with one’s own (cf. Festinger, 1957).

Worldview and External Interpretation

Worldview constitutes one part of the interpretive process by which we evaluate information—our metaphorical "reading of the entrails." The other part involves the external information we receive from others. Our interpretation of this information is influenced by multiple factors, with worldview being a key component but not the only one. Additional elements, such as prior experiences, cognitive biases, and emotional states, also shape how we process and integrate new information into our understanding (cf. Kelly, 1955).

Situational Influence on Belief

Situational factors and attributes of the speaker play significant roles in shaping our openness to new ideas, influencing how receptive we are to others' perspectives. These contextual elements subtly affect our interpretive process. Yet, despite these influences, we continue engaging in what can be likened to "reading the entrails," as interpretation remains a subjective and speculative endeavor (cf. Goffman, 1959; Cialdini, 2001).

Confusing Worldview with Truth

A major issue emerges when individuals mistake their personal worldview, or the perspectives presented by others, for objective truth. When information aligns with one's biases, it often goes unchallenged, even though both the individual and the information source might be entirely incorrect. Trust in these sources is shaped by various factors, including political biases, personal agendas, survival needs, corporate influence, and pressures toward conformity or groupthink. Despite these influences, the act remains akin to "reading the entrails," as interpretation is deeply subjective and shaped by external pressures (cf. Janis, 1982; Kahneman, 2011).

Consequences of Differing Beliefs

Disagreements over beliefs can lead to harmful outcomes when they escalate beyond mere differences of opinion. Friendships may dissolve, family bonds strain, and, on a broader scale, conflicts and wars are waged. These divisions can even lead to extreme actions such as torture, ostracism, and other detrimental consequences—all rooted in interpretive differences. As beliefs are subject to complex interpretive factors, this "reading of the entrails" reveals our attempts to make sense of things, though, collectively, we often struggle with accuracy and discernment (cf. Haidt, 2012; Festinger, 1957).

The Imperfections of Science

Science, too, is far from flawless; it faces significant, well-documented challenges. Contrary to the simplified, idealized version often taught to students, science is not a perfect, objective machine but is instead a complex and often imperfect process. Its portrayal as an infallible pathway to truth misses the nuanced reality, where biases, funding pressures, and human limitations frequently shape research outcomes (cf. Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1975).

Personal Skepticism and Belief

I do not claim to maintain a rigorously skeptical stance any more effectively than others. Like everyone, I establish certain foundational beliefs within my worldview. The primary difference may be that I approach both my own beliefs and the assertions of others with a somewhat heightened level of skepticism—though likely not enough. Despite this inclination, I still metaphorically "put a stake in the ground" for certain beliefs, some of which I hold quite firmly. My values, in particular, tend to be held with a degree of absolutism and are not readily subject to change (cf. Rokeach, 1973).

Change in Beliefs Over Time

A key point for any critical thinker is the recognition that beliefs held a decade ago likely differ from those held today. Beliefs evolve as we forget past views, encounter new information, and refine our understanding, often becoming more nuanced and qualified. Exposure to fresh ideas and the gradual fading of old ones contribute to this shift. While values tend to be more resistant to change than specific beliefs, they too can evolve over time as perspectives broaden or priorities shift (cf. Rokeach, 1973; Kuhn, 1962).

Values as a Species of Belief

Values can be understood as a subset of beliefs, distinguished primarily by their emotional significance. The term "values" reflects this resonance, suggesting that they may relate more closely to perceptions of what is appropriate or desirable rather than to objective truths. However, this distinction is not universal. Some individuals equate their values with truth, perceiving them as inherently correct rather than as subjective preferences (cf. Rokeach, 1973; Haidt, 2012).

Religion and Values

Religious adherents frequently perceive their beliefs as absolute truths, often viewing them as direct revelations from a divine source. From an agnostic or skeptical viewpoint, this conviction may seem unfounded, yet it is widely held, likely representing a majority perspective. Despite the diversity across religious and belief systems, people tend to form strong attachments to their religious views, integrating values that reinforce these beliefs. Often, these values, deeply entwined with religious identity, include positions that might now be regarded as outdated or even immoral by contemporary ethical standards (cf. Durkheim, 1912; Taylor, 2007).

Political Opinions and Media Influence

Political opinions are pervasive yet often problematic, as many people trust pundits despite these figures interpreting information in much the same speculative way as anyone else. Predictive fields, broadly speaking, tend to have poor accuracy, with polling in particular facing significant, well-documented issues (cf. Silver, 2016). Mainstream media similarly suffers from substantial, well-known problems, often functioning as paid advocates for wealthy and influential interests. Numerous journalists, including but not limited to Noam Chomsky, have highlighted issues of media bias and control, particularly regarding the influence exerted by governments and powerful entities. Consequently, trust in mainstream media may be misplaced (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 2004).

Alternative Media and Subjective Interpretations

The short answer to whether alternative media is trustworthy is also no. Individuals in alternative media, regardless of sincerity, interpret information through their own worldview, ultimately engaging in the same speculative process as mainstream commentators. This interpretive approach means they may present perspectives that align with one’s own beliefs or appear correct, but this alignment offers no indication of actual accuracy. As with all competing opinions, when interpretations differ, at most one can be correct—if indeed any of them are correct at all (cf. McChesney, 2013; Pariser, 2011).

Worldview and Epistemic Bias

No one’s views deserve a privileged status in the realm of knowledge; they are no more likely to be true than anyone else’s. While personal beliefs may turn out to be accurate, they could just as easily be incorrect. Lacking the perspective of an omniscient being, one's views remain subjective interpretations rather than definitive truths (cf. Nagel, 1986). Yet, it is common for individuals to perceive their worldview from an assumed epistemic high ground, implicitly trusting their own thoughts and judgments as correct. This sense of epistemic privilege can obscure the possibility of error, reinforcing the potential for self-deception (cf. Kahneman, 2011).

Confirmation Bias and Attributing Negative Value

People often hold a deep-seated belief in their own correctness, viewing themselves as better informed, more rational, and ultimately "right," while attributing opposing views to others as stemming from poor information, propaganda, or sheer error. This mindset can lead not only to viewing others as simply mistaken but as fundamentally lacking in intelligence or even as morally deficient. Such assumptions are often unfounded and reveal an overreliance on one’s own perspective as privileged or inherently correct. This tendency, often fueled by confirmation bias, underscores the irrationality of dismissing differing perspectives as inferior rather than recognizing them as alternative interpretations of the same reality (cf. Nickerson, 1998; Haidt, 2012).

The Endemic Nature of Self-Righteousness

This tendency defies common sense, yet it persists widely. Like most people, I often believe my views are superior, considering myself more informed, a clearer thinker, with better access to reliable information. Simultaneously, others view me through the same lens, convinced that I am the one who is mistaken. This self-assurance appears endemic to human nature. Although I try to remember the pitfalls of assuming my beliefs are always correct, this self-reminder does not always prevent me from falling into the trap of self-righteousness (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004).

Contradictory Assertions and Truth

Returning to the central issue, when two assertions are entirely contradictory, it is logically impossible for both to be true; however, this does not imply that either must be correct. In complex discussions, multiple contradictory assertions are often interwoven with points of agreement, further complicating the search for truth. Rarely do we limit ourselves to a single assertion, as multiple, interconnected points are typically presented, creating an intricate web of statements that can be challenging to untangle (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV; Toulmin, 1958).

Staking Territory on Truth

Despite logical complexities, we often cling to the conviction that our beliefs represent what is right and good, while opposing views are seen as misguided or even morally suspect. This tendency to "stake out territory" on what we consider truth is nearly universal, with each individual placing markers around beliefs they hold as accurate. The degree of attachment varies, with some individuals adopting a more dogmatic stance than others, but the impulse to claim truth as one’s own remains pervasive (cf. Festinger, 1957; Haidt, 2012).

Nietzsche on Facts and Interpretations

Nietzsche is often quoted, in translation, as saying, “There are no facts, only interpretations.” This perspective reflects his skepticism about objective truths, particularly in complex, abstract domains. While there is validity to his point—many of our beliefs are indeed shaped by interpretation—it may be an overstatement to say there are no facts at all. Practical, concrete facts are essential to navigate the world effectively, providing a basis for survival. Yet, once we move into complex or abstract issues, opinion increasingly overshadows factual certainty, suggesting that, while Nietzsche highlighted an important dynamic, he perhaps underestimated the role of factual knowledge in everyday life (cf. Nietzsche, 1887; Goodman, 1978).

Conventions and Social Understanding

Shared social understandings are better categorized as arbitrary conventions rather than facts. Such conventions lack the universality typically associated with factual information, as they are fluid and vary across individuals, communities, and cultures. These are not fixed truths but rather agreed-upon norms that facilitate social interaction within specific contexts. The variability of these conventions underscores their nature as culturally contingent rather than objectively factual (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953; Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

Summary

This exploration delves into the boundaries between objective facts, subjective interpretations, and culturally shaped conventions, highlighting the complex dynamics that inform human understanding and belief. While practical facts provide a foundation for survival and interaction with the physical world, interpretations dominate our perceptions, especially in complex or abstract domains. Social conventions, though not factual, serve as flexible frameworks that vary by culture and facilitate communal understanding. Yet, individuals frequently regard their interpretations as universal truths, leading to biases and conflicts that are ingrained in human thought. By examining these distinctions, the discussion underscores the challenges inherent in separating fact from belief, especially within the fluid realms of social norms and personal worldview.

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