Understanding Language: Thoughts Coming Before Words
The Inchoate Awareness That Precedes Linguistic Expression
Note: I had some thoughts. I had ChatGPT elaborate on them. They may or may not be connected, but they all deal with the vagaries of cognition and language."
Introduction
The relationship between thought and language is intricate, with thoughts often seeming to precede or shape verbal expression. This essay examines the phenomena of forgotten intentions, losing one’s train of thought, and grappling for words—all of which reveal the complexities of pre-linguistic cognition. By exploring these experiences, we can gain insight into how thoughts might exist in an unformed, pre-verbal stage, awaiting translation into language.
Discussion
The Cognitive Gap: Losing One's Train of Thought
"I want to talk about losing one's train of thought, a common experience for many. I can't say for all, because I'm not all, but I and people I know do suffer cognitive gaps, they lose their train of thought when they are conversing or writing or even talking to themselves."
Losing one's train of thought is a common occurrence, characterized by an abrupt interruption or shift in mental focus. This “cognitive gap” reflects how thoughts in development can be fragile, dissipating before they reach complete verbalization. Cognitive science research associates this experience with attentional shifts and the brain’s limitation in sustaining a single thread of thought when distracted (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Studies suggest that when focus shifts, the brain’s default mode network—an area associated with self-referential and internally generated thought—activates, leading to what we experience as “mind-wandering” or, in this case, a lost train of thought (Fox et al., 2015). These interruptions are often attributed to the brain’s attempt to process or prioritize incoming stimuli, and they underscore the challenge of translating raw cognitive impressions into structured language (Smith & Christoff, 2018).
The Search for Forgotten Intentions
"A person may go looking for something. By the time they get into the next room, they've forgotten what they were looking for. Sometimes going back to the original room cues the memory for what you are looking for; sometimes it does not."
The “doorway effect” is a phenomenon where intentions fade upon entering a new physical space, only to sometimes be revived when returning to the original room. This experience hints at how thoughts can be tethered to specific environments, even before they are fully verbalized. Studies in memory and cognitive psychology link this effect to context-dependent memory encoding, where environmental cues play a critical role in anchoring specific intentions or memories (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). By compartmentalizing memory based on physical context, the brain makes efficient use of spatial associations, which can help or hinder intention retrieval depending on context (Radvansky et al., 2011). This environmental dependency suggests that intentions—especially those not yet formulated into words—are linked to physical surroundings, adding a layer of complexity to the cognitive process of retrieving thoughts that remain inchoate.
Tip-of-the-Tongue Moments
"A person may be about to say something but they can't think of a word or a name. It's on the tip of their tongue. it may come back in a few minutes, in a few hours, or never. Sometimes, once cued, it comes into memory."
The “tip-of-the-tongue” phenomenon highlights the challenges of retrieving specific linguistic information when a memory seems close but inaccessible. This experience is particularly illustrative of how thought and language intersect, with partially recalled ideas often blocked by a temporary retrieval failure. According to Schwartz (2006), these moments arise when semantic memory partially activates without complete access to phonological elements, thereby creating a sense of “almost knowing” the word. This state, in which a person recognizes the contours of a memory without being able to fully articulate it, points to a cognitive space where language is within reach yet eludes expression (Schwartz, 2010). Cognitive research indicates that unresolved tip-of-the-tongue experiences are common and may occur because the brain’s lexical network fails to fully link to phonological memory in real-time (Brown, 2012). The phenomenon thus demonstrates that even well-formed thoughts may not fully translate into verbal expression, underscoring the complex relationship between thought and language.
Gathering Thoughts: The Pre-Verbal Stage of Expression
"Sometimes, before a person speaks, they say something like 'Well, I need time to gather my thoughts.' They may gather their thoughts, it is unclear just what that entails, but they do it. When the words come out, the precise expression, the words that come out, can be very variable. This is the way it is with language. We can say things in a numerable ways with the same essential meaning. Although the nuances might be different, the idea remains the same."
The expression “gathering one’s thoughts” refers to a cognitive stage where individuals prepare ideas for verbal expression. This phase, although challenging to pinpoint, involves organizing and shaping an idea before transforming it into words. This cognitive preparation reflects a process where inchoate thoughts undergo “cognitive structuring” to achieve coherence in language (Zlatev & Sinha, 2020). Unlike physical images or spatial cognition, which some suggest as non-linguistic codes, this pre-verbal phase might be better understood as involving implicit linguistic codes—a form of abstract cognition that indirectly resembles language without being overtly verbalized. In this stage, ideas may be arranged and tested mentally, allowing for flexible, varied expression once verbalized (Slobin, 2003). This flexibility suggests that thoughts in their inchoate state allow for a range of possible expressions, underscoring how language can capture varying nuances while maintaining core meaning.
Large Language Model AI and the Illusion of Thought
"Note this is true of LLM-AI; they can also do the same thing, which is a mystery. Without any intelligence, they still reproduce language based upon statistical word chasing."
Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a unique case in cognitive science, mimicking human-like language structures without an underlying awareness of thought or meaning. These models generate language by identifying patterns and probabilities rather than understanding or experiencing cognitive processes (Bender & Koller, 2020). Though LLMs lack genuine cognition, their capacity to produce coherent language sequences raises questions about the extent to which linguistic output must reflect thought or understanding. This ability to emulate coherent language via pattern recognition rather than true pre-linguistic cognition highlights the role of structured language in approximating understanding, even when genuine comprehension is absent (Marcus, 2020). LLMs demonstrate that statistical language generation may superficially resemble human language but lacks the underlying conceptual awareness integral to actual thought.
Segues and Slips: When Thoughts Drift
"Getting back to people, losing one's train of thought usually happens when you're talking, and for some reason you go off, you segue into another topic, and don't realize what the original thought was all about; you were about to say something, and then that thought, being elusive, slips away."
The tendency for thoughts to segue into unintended topics underscores the brain’s associative cognitive structure, where related ideas spontaneously emerge in sequence (Christoff et al., 2009). This tendency is linked to the brain’s associative memory system, which is inherently non-linear and relies on connections between ideas rather than a single, straightforward path of thought. This associative nature, which facilitates the transition from one idea to another, often leads to an unintended shift, whereby the initial thought is temporarily lost. The brain’s network of associative links can thus explain the elusive quality of certain thoughts and why structured verbalization may occasionally fail to capture the fluidity of mental associations.
The Pre-Linguistic Space of Thought
"So there's this pre-verbal, inchoate area for thought, pre-linguistic, in the sense of before the word is uttered, not in the sense of not having developed language (you assume they've developed language) and yet they have thoughts that are not quite formulated into words yet."
The notion of a pre-linguistic cognitive space, where thoughts exist without being tied to specific words, remains a topic of interdisciplinary interest. Rather than assuming that this space is dominated by mental images or spatial cognition, an alternative view might consider that thoughts in this stage could involve implicit linguistic codes—subtle, abstract representations that resemble language without fully being verbalized (Barsalou, 2008). These implicit linguistic codes suggest a structured but flexible mode of cognition where ideas form without needing precise words, allowing for a broad range of potential expressions (Bermúdez, 2003). In this framework, the cognitive precursor to language reflects an adaptable and inherently inchoate awareness that lends itself to multiple linguistic interpretations, reflecting the brain’s capacity for abstract, pre-verbalized structuring.
In Search of an Academic Lens
"I haven't read a good discussion of this idea of thoughts that have not yet become words. The closest I've come is discussions of about the reported lack of inner speech, but that doesn't really capture it. It's the inchoate awareness that precedes linguistic expression, and that linguistic expression can be multi-fold for that inchoate awareness. I haven't encountered any discussions that are intelligible on this. I don't even know which scholars are looking at it. I don't even know what discipline it would be, maybe linguistics, maybe philosophy, maybe psycholinguistics, maybe cognitive psychology, maybe neurology. It must cross over many fields."
The study of inchoate awareness preceding linguistic expression indeed spans multiple disciplines. Cognitive psychology, psycholinguistics, and philosophy each examine facets of inner speech, memory, and pre-linguistic awareness, though none have captured this intermediary state in its entirety. This suggests an interdisciplinary gap, as understanding the pre-linguistic state requires insights from diverse fields (Bermúdez, 2003). Bridging these disciplines could lead to new perspectives on thought, language, and the extent to which cognition relies on pre-verbal structuring, further elucidating the complex relationship between thought and linguistic expression.
Summary
Language and thought interact in complex ways, with pre-verbal stages of awareness suggesting that thoughts may exist in a fluid, adaptable cognitive state before solidifying into language. Experiences like losing one’s train of thought, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, and context-dependent memory reveal that thought often precedes verbalization in ways not fully captured by conventional explanations. Understanding this relationship requires an interdisciplinary lens, where thought may not consist of images or spatial forms but may instead involve an implicit pre-linguistic structure awaiting verbal expression.
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