Reason: On the Incompleteness of Description

Why the World is Underspecified

Author’s Preface

The Reason series examines how human beings attempt to make sense of their world with tools that are always partial. Each essay explores a theme that, though it may appear obvious, reveals deeper mysteries when pressed. This one considers the fact that no description of the world can ever be complete. The claim is deceptively simple, but it challenges assumptions about language, knowledge, and reason itself.

What makes the theme amusing, if not disconcerting, is that reason thrives on insufficiency. Incomplete descriptions do not paralyze action; they enable it. We live and think in a world that is underspecified, yet that very underspecification is what allows language, understanding, and survival to be possible. The irony is that while incompleteness seems to signal a failure of reason, it is also what makes reason workable.

Introduction

Every description of the world is incomplete. This incompleteness persists even when the scope is restricted—a bounded moment in time, a single object, or a confined place. Descriptions omit more than they include, yet they remain useful. They allow us to manipulate aspects of the world, to act, and sometimes to thrive. This paradox is at the heart of human reason: no complete account can ever be given, yet fragments suffice.

The discussion that follows unfolds in three parts: first, the structural reasons why language and understanding cannot capture the whole; second, the pragmatic way partial knowledge proves adequate; and third, the enduring mystery of how reason can work at all in a world that continually outruns it.

Discussion

Incompleteness as Structural Necessity

To describe anything is to abstract, and to abstract is to omit. Language is not the world; it is a system of symbols. Alfred Korzybski’s famous maxim, “the map is not the territory,” underscores this point. A map works because it excludes details. A description operates by the same logic. Even the most elaborate account cannot match the fullness of lived reality.

Different observers emphasize different aspects: a scientist may chart variables, a novelist may dwell on sensory impressions, a historian may focus on causal chains. None captures the totality. Incompleteness is not accidental but necessary for representation to function at all.

Understanding as Open-Ended

Human understanding mirrors the same condition. Comprehension is never final. Theories change, concepts evolve, and even everyday judgments are subject to revision. We can always, without limit beyond exhaustion, say more.

Karl Popper insisted that scientific knowledge remains provisional, always falsifiable. Michael Polanyi argued that tacit knowledge, which exceeds language, grounds explicit knowledge. Together they reveal that understanding has no endpoint. Each insight is a step in an unending process.

Pragmatic Sufficiency

Despite its incompleteness, description often suffices. A rough map can guide a traveler. A rule of thumb can prevent disaster. A medical diagnosis may not capture the totality of illness but can direct treatment. William James’s pragmatism captures this principle: truth is what works, not what exhausts all possible detail; as if this would even be possible. In this way, underspecification is not a defect but a condition for practical reason.

The Enduring Mystery

The mystery lies in how much can be accomplished with so little. Fragments of description enable survival in a reality that dwarfs human capacities. Yet the insufficiency remains. Sometimes partial knowledge guides effectively; at other times it fails catastrophically. The paradox is that reason cannot escape its limits, yet thrives because of them. To recognize this is to see that underspecification is not only a fact of life but one of its deepest puzzles.

Summary

Descriptions of the world are incomplete by necessity. They omit as much as they include, yet they serve as guides to action. Understanding is likewise unfinished, provisional, and open-ended. The sufficiency of description lies not in its completeness but in its pragmatic adequacy. The paradox and mystery of reason is that it works at all, given the scale of what it leaves unsaid.

Readings

Korzybski, A. (1933). Science and sanity: An introduction to non-Aristotelian systems and general semantics. International Non-Aristotelian Library.

Korzybski’s massive and difficult book has been called both pioneering and eccentric, but it contains one of the most enduring insights into the limits of representation. His line “the map is not the territory” has become proverbial. By it, he meant that language, like maps, is a symbolic structure that simplifies reality, highlighting only certain features while omitting others. A map that attempted to include every detail would be identical to the land itself and therefore useless. Likewise, descriptions are functional precisely because they omit detail. Korzybski insisted that failure to grasp this distinction produces confusion, dogmatism, and error: people treat words as if they were the things they stand for, or treat abstract categories as if they were concrete. He also introduced the practice of “indexing”—adding qualifiers to remind us of differences (e.g., “dog₁,” “dog₂”)—to illustrate that no two entities are ever exactly the same, and that language glosses over this uniqueness. In the context of this essay, Korzybski provides the clearest demonstration of why the world is underspecified in description: language and thought must leave things out in order to function, but forgetting that omission leads to illusions of completeness.

Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. Doubleday & Company.

Polanyi argued that much of what we know cannot be put into words. His central phrase, “we know more than we can tell,” captures this idea. He illustrated it with examples drawn from science, art, and skilled practice. A physician, for instance, recognizes subtle bodily signs of illness without being able to spell out all the steps of recognition. A cyclist balances a bicycle without consciously calculating torque and angles. A scientist pursuing a line of research follows hunches and intuitions that cannot be reduced to explicit reasoning. These cases show that formal description can only capture part of what is going on, because much of understanding remains implicit in perception, embodiment, and practice. For Polanyi, explicit knowledge rests upon a vast substratum of tacit knowledge. In terms of underspecification, his work demonstrates that even the most thorough account leaves out the operative, unarticulated know-how that makes action possible. No description can ever close this gap, because tacit knowledge is not reducible to language—it must be lived and enacted.

Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. Hutchinson.

Popper’s philosophy of science was a reaction against the idea that knowledge can ever be fully justified or completed. He proposed instead that science advances by conjectures and refutations. A scientific theory is never verified; it only survives repeated attempts at falsification. For example, Newtonian mechanics worked remarkably well for centuries, but was eventually superseded in certain domains by Einstein’s relativity. Theories are thus provisional and open-ended. Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability reveals why scientific description is structurally incomplete: there is no final theory, only theories that stand until displaced by new evidence or deeper insight. In addition, Popper rejected induction as a way of securing certainty. No matter how many times an event is observed, it cannot logically guarantee the next occurrence. For the essay’s purposes, Popper demonstrates that underspecification is built into science itself: every description is tentative, partial, and awaiting revision. Science does not escape the incompleteness of language but enshrines it as its core method.

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. Chandler Publishing Company.

Bateson’s essays explore the interconnectedness of mind, communication, and ecology. He argued that understanding any system requires seeing it as part of a larger whole, but descriptions inevitably isolate and abstract. His concept of the “double bind”—a situation in which conflicting messages trap a person in an impossible position—shows how incompleteness in communication can produce psychological distress. At the same time, Bateson highlighted that meaning emerges through context, feedback, and pattern, all of which exceed what can be captured in a single statement. His insistence that “the unit of survival is not the individual but the organism-in-its-environment” underscores how partial our normal descriptions are: they treat isolated entities when reality is systemic. In relation to underspecification, Bateson demonstrates that what is left out of a description can matter as much as what is included. His ecological approach expands the essay’s theme by showing that omission is not just a feature of language but a structural condition of all attempts to model living systems.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. Longmans, Green, and Co.

James argued that truth should be understood in terms of practical consequences. An idea is “true” insofar as it works, helping us navigate and survive, not because it corresponds to some final, exhaustive description of reality. For instance, a sailor may not know all the physics of tides but can rely on practical knowledge of patterns to reach shore safely. James’s pragmatic test of truth aligns directly with the essay’s claim that underspecified accounts are often adequate. Truth is not about completeness but about sufficiency for purpose. James illustrated this with vivid examples, such as religious beliefs, scientific hypotheses, and everyday judgments. Each can be “true enough” to function, even though none is complete. His philosophy reveals why incompleteness need not be paralyzing. In fact, it is the very condition under which beliefs become useful: by being partial and oriented toward action.

Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of worldmaking. Hackett Publishing.

Goodman challenged the idea of a single, unified world waiting to be described. Instead, he argued that human beings engage in “worldmaking” through the use of symbolic systems. Science, art, and everyday discourse each “make” worlds by selecting features, establishing categories, and imposing order. For Goodman, description is not a neutral reflection of reality but an active construction. He illustrated this with examples ranging from painting to scientific modeling, showing that what counts as an accurate “rendering” depends on the rules of a particular symbolic practice. His notion of the “rightness of rendering” emphasizes that there are many possible ways to depict or describe, none final. This view directly supports the essay’s theme: the world is underspecified because our descriptions do not uncover a finished totality but create multiple partial framings. Goodman’s pluralism about worlds highlights how incompleteness is constitutive of representation, not merely a limitation.

Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. Basic Books.

Geertz introduced the idea of “thick description” in anthropology, using the example of a wink. A thin description might simply note that “a man closed one eye rapidly.” A thick description, by contrast, situates the act in context: was it a signal, a parody, a secret collusion, or something else? Yet even the thickest description, Geertz argued, cannot be complete, because it must interpret meaning within cultural frames that are themselves partial. His method underscores that description is always interpretive, never neutral. For the essay, Geertz illustrates vividly why underspecification is fundamental: the act of description cannot simply report facts but must embed them in webs of meaning that are open to reinterpretation. No account captures all layers, and understanding remains provisional. His anthropology exemplifies how incompleteness operates in practice, not just in theory.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Blackwell.

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy insists that meaning is use, and that language operates within “language games” tied to forms of life. He dismantles the idea of a single, systematic account of meaning. For example, the word “game” does not have one essence but a family of overlapping uses. His reflections show that any attempt to give a complete account of language collapses under its own ambition: there is always another context, another use, another layer of meaning. Although his style is fragmented and cryptic, the implications are clear: descriptions are underspecified because words derive meaning from endlessly varied practices. For the essay, Wittgenstein contributes the insight that incompleteness is not just a feature of long descriptions of the world but is woven into language itself. There is no “last word” because meaning is always embedded in the flux of human activity.

Eco, U. (1976). A theory of semiotics. Indiana University Press.

Eco develops a systematic account of signs and sign systems, arguing that semiosis—the process of producing meaning through signs—is inherently unlimited. Every sign points to other signs in an endless chain of interpretation. For example, a word in a dictionary is explained by other words, which in turn require explanation. There is no final stopping point. Eco highlights that signs function within cultural codes, which themselves shift and evolve. His analysis underscores that language is recursive and self-referential, and that attempts to produce a complete description of meaning are doomed to infinite regress. In the context of underspecification, Eco demonstrates why descriptions are not only incomplete but uncloseable: they open into further descriptions without end. His work provides a semiotic foundation for the claim that the world, as grasped in language, is underspecified by necessity.