Exploring Inner Speech and Inchoate Thought

Unformed Thought, Attention, and the Foundations of Cognition

Note: Again, I relied on ChatGPT for assistance with research and wordsmithing. The ideas are my own. You can blame any wrong-headedness on me and my shoddy introspection.

Author’s Preface

A few weeks ago, I was with my wife, daughter, and son-in-law. My daughter said that although she had a lot of inner speech, her husband didn’t. He concurred. She also asserted that this had been researched by psychologists. I thought, That’s pretty strange. I had trouble processing it, so the idea stuck with me. This claim made no sense at all to me, since I use inner speech so often and so consistently.

I discussed this with an artist relative of mine, and he was astounded at the idea that someone could create a work of art without using inner speech. I thought, OK, that makes sense. He believes inner speech is essential, and he clearly uses it himself—he is, after all, an accomplished artist and painter.

I am not a bad visualizer or audiolizer (to coin a word), but at first, I was very perplexed by the claim that psychologists had discovered people who don’t use inner speech much. Initially, I thought this was ridiculous. I turned to ChatGPT and did a little research on the topic. Over time, I tried drafting essays about it but struggled to pull my thoughts together.

Eventually, I reflected further and realized that there are periods of inchoate thought—pre-linguistic, non-sensory, and not yet verbalized. These moments are routine. Before we say something, there are periods where nothing is going on except that we are taking time to prepare our words, to “gather our thoughts,” as people say.

It seems to me that, although I never encountered this notion during my schooling as a student of experimental and developmental psychology, it is probably an important concept in cognitive psychology. I do not know if it has been researched, and I recognize immense difficulties in studying it from any perspective.

Hence, I prepared this essay.

Introduction

Human cognition encompasses a spectrum ranging from explicit, articulated inner speech to nebulous, pre-verbal states of awareness. Inner speech, the internal dialogue that humans use to plan, reason, and reflect, is a well-researched phenomenon in cognitive science (Vygotsky, 1986; Fernyhough, 2016). It represents a uniquely human capacity to organize thought through language. By contrast, inchoate thought—an unformed, pre-verbal state of cognition—remains poorly understood and underexplored. This type of thought seems distinct from sensory perception or mental imagery and serves as a precursor to more structured cognitive processes.

Inchoate thought appears not to be simply an absence of thought; rather a state of raw cognitive potential that exists before language or sensory engagement organizes awareness into identifiable structures. Everyday experiences such as the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon or the need to "gather one’s thoughts" point to its existence. These states indicate a form of thinking that is unarticulated and unbound by language or sensory modalities. Both humans and in all probability animals experience inchoate states, which may reflect the disengagement of attentional mechanisms from specific sensory inputs. This paper examines the interplay between inner speech, inchoate thought, and attentional control, emphasizing the foundational role of inchoate cognition in human and animal thought processes.

Inchoate Thought: A Pre-Verbal, Non-Sensory State

Inchoate thought seems distinct from sensory perception, visualization, audiolization or verbalized inner dialogue. It represents a state of awareness that precedes the organization of cognition into sensory or linguistic forms. Unlike sensory perception, which involves the processing of external stimuli through specific modalities, inchoate thought exists independently of such inputs. It is not an extension of sensory experience but rather an unstructured, pre-conscious cognitive substrate.

Sensory perception is tightly regulated by attentional mechanisms. Humans and animals selectively focus on sensory inputs relevant to their immediate goals or survival needs. For instance, a predator tracking prey may shift attention between visual cues, auditory signals, and olfactory stimuli. However, there may be moments when the predator is disengaged from specific sensory modalities. These intervals, when no particular sensory input dominates and attention is momentarily unallocated, reflect inchoate cognition. During these states, the predator's awareness persists, but it is formless and unbound by sensory perception.

In humans, this disengagement of attention from sensory modalities more clearly evident. The phenomenon of needing "time to gather one’s thoughts" exemplifies this state. It reflects a moment when awareness exists in a raw, unstructured form, prior to the organization of thought into words or images. The "tip of the tongue" experience, where an individual senses the presence of an idea but cannot articulate it, further highlights the pre-verbal nature of inchoate thought. There are gaps between internal and external utterance both. These experiences suggest that inchoate cognition is a foundational aspect of human thought, enabling the transition from raw awareness to structured mental processes.

Inner Speech: The Verbal Organization of Thought

Inner speech, by contrast, is the structured, language-based internal dialogue that allows humans to articulate, plan, and reflect on their thoughts. Unlike inchoate thought, inner speech is explicitly tied to language and involves the silent verbalization of ideas. It serves as a cognitive tool for organizing thought, solving problems, and engaging in self-regulation (Vygotsky, 1986).

Neuroscientific research has shown that inner speech activates brain regions associated with language processing, such as Broca’s area and the left inferior frontal gyrus (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015). This suggests that inner speech shares structural and functional characteristics with spoken language. While its reliance on linguistic forms distinguishes it from inchoate thought, inner speech often emerges from the latter. For example, when one takes time to gather thoughts, the process begins with inchoate awareness and culminates in the verbal articulation of those thoughts through inner speech.

The extent to which individuals rely on inner speech varies. Some claim to use minimal inner speech, relying more on visual or sensory modes of thinking (Hurlburt et al., 2016). However, such claims have been met with skepticism. Critics argue that inner speech is so integral to human cognition that individuals may underestimate its ubiquity or fail to recognize it as a distinct form of thought (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015).

The Role of Attention in Cognition

Attention serves as a mediating mechanism between inchoate thought, sensory perception, and inner speech. Both humans and animals use attention to selectively engage with sensory inputs, directing cognitive resources toward relevant stimuli. However, attention can also disengage from sensory inputs, allowing for inchoate thought to emerge.

In animals, attentional flexibility is evident in behaviors such as hunting or foraging. A predator may shift attention between distant sounds, close sounds, nearby movement, or olfactory traces of prey. When not actively attending to any sensory modality, the predator probably exists in a state of inchoate cognition. This formless awareness would allow for rapid re-engagement with sensory inputs when environmental conditions demand it.

In humans, attentional disengagement enables transitions between different cognitive states. For instance, moments of introspection or mental wandering often begin with inchoate thought, unbound by specific sensory or verbal inputs. As attention shifts, these inchoate states can transition into structured inner speech or visualized thought, facilitating problem-solving or creative insights.

Implications for Cognitive Science

The study of inchoate thought and its relationship to inner speech and attention has profound implications for understanding human and animal cognition. Inchoate thought provides a bridge between raw awareness and structured cognition, underpinning both sensory perception and verbal reasoning. Its role in transitions between cognitive states highlights its foundational importance in both development and evolution.

In human development, inchoate thought likely dominates pre-linguistic cognition, serving as a precursor to inner speech. Infants exhibit proto-cognitive abilities, such as attention shifting and problem-solving, that occur independently of language (Trevarthen, 1980). Similarly, non-human animals rely on inchoate cognition to navigate their environments and adapt to changing conditions. These parallels suggest a continuity between human and animal minds, challenging the intellectually impoverished assumptions of human exceptionalism.

Research into inchoate thought remains limited, largely due to its elusive and unobservable nature. However, interdisciplinary approaches that combine neuroscience, psychology, and animal behavior studies could shed light on this phenomenon. For example, examining attentional mechanisms in animals and infants may reveal how inchoate thought operates as a precursor to sensory engagement and verbalization.

Conclusion

Inchoate thought and inner speech represent two distinct but interconnected dimensions of cognition. Inchoate thought is a pre-verbal, non-sensory state that provides the raw substrate for structured mental processes, including inner speech. Sensory perception, regulated by attentional mechanisms, operates alongside these cognitive modes, enabling humans and animals to adapt to their environments.

While inner speech has been extensively studied for its role in human cognition, inchoate thought remains poorly understood. Everyday experiences such as needing "time to gather my thoughts" or the "tip of the tongue" phenomenon highlight its presence in human thought. In animals, inchoate cognition may underpin behaviors that require attentional flexibility and sensory disengagement.

Understanding inchoate thought could deepen our knowledge of the developmental and evolutionary origins of cognition, offering insights into the foundational mechanisms that precede language and perception. Further research is needed to explore this elusive but essential aspect of thought.

References

Alderson-Day, B., & Fernyhough, C. (2015). Inner speech: Development, cognitive functions, phenomenology, and neurobiology. Psychological Bulletin, 141(5), 931–965. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000021

de Waal, F. B. M. (2016). Are we smart enough to know how smart animals are? W.W. Norton & Company. https://www.amazon.ca/Are-Smart-Enough-Know-Animals/dp/0393353664

Note: de Waal is one of my favorite writers. — Ephektikoi

Fernyhough, C. (2016). The voices within: The history and science of how we talk to ourselves. Basic Books. https://www.amazon.ca/Voices-Within-History-Science-Ourselves/dp/0465096808

Hurlburt, R. T., Alderson-Day, B., Fernyhough, C., & Kühn, S. (2016). What goes on in the resting-state? A qualitative glimpse into resting-state experience in the scanner. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1071. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2016-22590-001

Trevarthen, C. (1980). The foundations of intersubjectivity: Development of interpersonal and cooperative understanding in infants. In D. Olson (Ed.), The social foundations of language and thought: Essays in honor of J.S. Bruner (pp. 316–342). W.W. Norton. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313142125_The_foundations_of_intersubjectivity_Development_of_interpersonal_and_cooperative_understanding_in_infants

Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language (A. Kozulin, Trans.). MIT Press. (Original work published 1934). https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262720014/thought-and-language/